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Abstract 
It is generally held amongst scholars of interest intermediation that interest groups are quite influential 
for policy-making. This has been demonstrated in studies of the national level and features very 
strongly in studies of US lobbying. It is also evident in the fact that interest group activities at the 
European level have been studied in great detail and are considered an important element of the EU’s 
system of multilevel governance. In the context of these studies, recent research by the author has come 
to a surprising result: in six case studies of day-to-day EU policy-making in the transport and IT 
sectors, private actors and interest groups could only influence the smaller details of legislation. In 
addition, they were only influential when the general political will of the decision-makers was either in 
support of their demands or indifferent to them. These findings lead to the question of what determines 
the success of interest groups, especially in light of the fact that studies of US lobbying come to very 
different results. Why is interest representation in the US so influential when it seems that at the EU-
level this is not quite the case? This paper compares findings on the influence of US lobbying with that 
of the EU-level and discusses what this means for democratic governance and the relationship of 
decision-makers to societal groups.  
 
 1. Introduction 
EU lobbying has long been perceived as influential for EU decision-making. An 
increasing stock of political science literature on EU interest representation has 
developed especially since the 1990s (see Mazey and Richardson 1993, 2001; 
Greenwood 1997, 2003; Wallace and Young 1997) – suggesting that nonstate actors 
must play an important role for the shaping of European policymaking.
1 This 
assumption is reinforced by the crucial role nonstate actors are attributed by models of 
multilevel governance (Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999) or by the special attention the 
European Commission has given to civil society interests.
2 However, most empirical 
studies of EU lobbying limit themselves to describing lobbying cases, but stop short 
of determining actual influence gained by lobbying. EU lobbying researchers seem to 
assume that the empirical evidence demonstrating influence of lobbying groups in 
other political systems, notably in the US, is a sufficient indicator to assume that the 
same holds true for EU lobbying. However, if it is not, important conclusions could 
be drawn for the relationship between decision-makers and nonstate actors in the 
context of European multilevel governance concepts.  
Recent empirical findings suggest indeed that there might be less influence than 
assumed. Instead, influence may depend on the political will of decision-makers. An 
recent extensive data set with survey data on the transport and information technology 
sector and with qualitative data on six lobbying cases shows this. Lobbyists with 
different opportunity structures supporting or hindering their work were successful 
whenever their interests were in line with a political will that had already been 
developed, or when decision-makers were indifferent towards the policy-outcome.
3 
They were unsuccessful in each issue in which their interests differed from those of 
the decision-makers (Michalowitz 2005). Lobbying outcomes that were satisfying for 
private actors analysed were strikingly in line with the political will of institutions, 
whereas dissatisfying outcomes seemed to be related to an opposite political will.
4 
These findings are supported by a number of scholars’ interpretations of well-known 
lobbying cases.
5 These observations should be analysed in more detail: if reasons for 
differences in lobbying impact lie in constraints and opportunities offered by the 
political systems themselves, this could have consequences for the relation between 
the voicing of interests and governance in a representative democratic democracy.  
                                                 
1 Policymaking already indicates that with regard to the European system, this paper’s analysis is 
limited to the creation of legislative acts under the community method of the Union. 
2 Culminating in a special chapter of the White Paper on European Governance (European Commission 
2001). 
3 The data was collected on the basis of 46 expert interviews on the 6 cases. For a more detailed 
account on the data collection and the cases, see Michalowitz (2005). 
4 When comparing the initial political will driving a regulation with the goals of the analysed actors, 
evidence suggested only weak lobbying influence. Lobbying interests in allegedly successful cases 
largely corresponded to an already present political will. Also, the impression of the political will 
driving lobbying influence was not weakened by the assessment  of the shift of position of decision-
making institutions over the course of the decision-making processes as well as sidelining and counter-
lobbying activities (see Michalowitz 2005). 
5 For instance, the allegedly extraordinary lobbying successes in high-politics cases, such as the 
influence of the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) on the development of the European 
Single Market, support the findings (Apeldoorn 2002; Cowles 1996). While the ERT claims to have 
initiated the Single European Market, the political dynamics of that period are sufficient evidence to 
argue that the Single Market was already on the EU agenda and received wide support not only from 
the ERT and a wide range of high-level companies but also from the Member States (Greenwood 2003: 
257 and 258). 
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Under what circumstances do interest groups gain influence? Which factors influence 
interest group impact on political decision-making? Are EU lobbyists applying 
inadequate lobbying tactics? Is it indeed the European political system restraining 
lobbying in a way that limits the influence external actors can have on the decision-
making?  
The above-cited evidence indicates that the success of EU lobbying activities may 
largely depend on or at least correspond to the political will that had generated 
independently from the exerted external pressure within the European institutions 
themselves. Hence, interest groups may contribute to EU decision-making – i.e. serve 
as service bureaux to the European institutions –, but it appears highly likely that they 
do not steer it – they cannot claim to be successfully spin-doctoring EU decision-
making. It appears puzzling that US scholars of interest intermediation, for instance, 
draw a different picture for their country (see Berry 1979; Kollman 1998; Schier 
2000; Rosenthal 2001).
6 Based on the above-cited initial observations in EU and US 
lobbying literature and previous original investigations of the author, the following 
article therefore seeks to identify factors of interest group influence. It will do so 
primarily by taking into account lobbying behaviour and institutional settings. This 
will be done with a comparative analysis of lobbying in the EU and the US. The 
reason to select a comparative design of these two political systems is twofold. 
Firstly, the question as to why EU lobbying may be less influential than it appears 
from literature is difficult to answer from looking at the EU alone. Literature so far 
has neither come up with a definition of influence, nor with a design to research 
factors determining it; what has been shown in studies of the author however, are 
situations in which lobbying has not been influential. However, the evidence was not 
sufficient to go beyond hypotheses to explain why. Gathering more data that are 
empirical, either on further non-influential and influential cases in the EU or in other 
states for comparison is therefore crucial to assess factors leading to influence on 
decision-making. Since US literature provides data already, it appears most useful to 
begin with a comparison of EU and US lobbying before going into more detailed 
studies of EU interest group (non) influence. 
The availability of US literature on the topic is the second reason to decide for a 
comparative analysis of the EU and the US. Interest group influence has already been 
studied for the American political system and definitions have been developed. 
Additionally, patterns of lobbying behaviour have been observed that, at least at a first 
superficial sight, suggest similar features as those of EU lobbying (see Rosenthal 
2001; Gardner 1991). This impression is backed by practitioners’ claims that Brussels 
lobbying is in many ways similar to US lobbying.
7 EU lobbying is increasingly 
                                                 
6 Berry cites various examples of successful lobbying cases where strong indicators for mind changes 
through interest group pressure can be pinpointed (Berry 1979). Kollman begins his book on lobbying 
strategies with an impressive example of successful pressure on the US Congress by mobilised senior 
citizens (whilst the targetted congressman did not change his mind, other congress members did and 
rejected the legislative proposal) (see Kollman 1998). On the basis of numerous of such case studies, 
more refined theoretical reflections about how lobbyists lobby successfully are made by authors such 
as Austen-Smith and Wright (1994) or, very recently, Baumgartner and Mahoney (2004) on the success 
of interest group coalitions. Exception: Whereas a study from the 1960s purports similar findings for 
the foreign trade sector of US policy-making – US lobbyists are identified as service bureaux for 
congress men and women (Bauer et al. 1963). 
7 Various conversations with American lobbyists in Brussels, and UBI lecture of John Disharoon, 
Caterpillar Public Affairs office Brussels (2000). 
  2perceived as ‚going American“ – lobbyists have increasingly adopted the level of 
professionalism of Washington, D.C. lobbying, and the structures as well as formal 
and informal rules which are used in the US in order to carry out successful lobbying.
8 
Comparing allegedly unsuccessful EU lobbying with allegedly successful US 
lobbying in terms of their similarities and differences may therefore serve to 
determine which factors may be decisive for lobbying influence. This impression is 
also the reason determining the choice of a ‘most similar’ research design, which is 
explained in more detail below. 
Methodologically, the evidence provided for comparison in this paper will be limited 
to already published evidence on EU or US lobbying. The published data, together 
with own experience in EU lobbying, will be put into context. While original 
systematic empirical studies should follow, an assessment of literature is sufficient to 
produce first insights into the question of interest group influence. 
The question whether interest groups are influential certainly primarily depends on 
the definition of influence. Research aiming to answer questions about influence is 
difficult, because the subject proper – influence – can hardly be operationalised, and 
the impact of individual factors can hardly be distinguished from the impact of other 
factors. The most basic definition of influence as it is also applied in the cited US 
studies is for interest groups to achieve the fulfilment of their interests – the end 
results (see Berry 1979: 183). As Steven Schier formulates: „Influence is the ability of 
a group to produce a desired outcome in government – whether that outcome involves 
stasis or change.“ (Schier 2000:158). Results, however, may not always be linkable to 
lobbying activities. A more neutral definition might be to identify influence as the 
achievement of a mind change of decision-makers. Max Weber’s definition of power 
can serve as a reference point to justify this understanding of influence. According to 
Weber (1980) [1921] power is the ability of an actor to force another actor, even 
against his own will, to pursue a certain course of action. Influence can be understood 
as a weaker form of power. An actor is being persuaded to perform a certain action, 
even if he initially did not want to do it. When applying this definition, the question 
whether or not persuasion has taken place most likely becomes visible in a 
comparison of policy outcomes and initial intentions of decision-makers.  
The following sections will firstly outline the methodological and theoretical 
framework in more detail – why apply a most similar research design rather than a 
most different design, and how does it apply to an EU/US lobbying influence 
comparison? What are the underlying hypotheses guiding the analysis? Then, two 
hypotheses competing in literature are tested according to the most similar research 
design. Factors of lobbying strategy, organisation, constraints, and opportunities for 
interest groups provided by the two different political systems are examined in order 
to single out variables that differ between the two systems. Finally, conclusions are 
made as to why lobbyists appear influential in the US but not in the EU. 
It has to be mentioned at this place that the analysis rests on a number of prior 
assumptions that would appear problematic in a larger empirical research framework. 
Thus, differences in lobbying strategies, structures, actors etc. between the two 
                                                 
8 For instance, political consultancies with commercial lobbyists have become important players in 
Brussels. In-house lobbyists of large companies play a major role in EU lobbying, whereas the 
formerly most important associations are still indispensable, but rather serve as a necessary information 
provider than as the only source of lobbying activities to their more financially potent members (see 
Michalowitz 2005).  
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they are induced by differences in the political systems. Essentially, the study does 
not take into account the possibility that policy fields display different logics of 
lobbying influence or failure; that the lack of representativeness of the data on which 
the original assumption of EU non-influence rests could bring a bias into the 
examination; and that factors other than those derived from the EU and US lobbying 
literature might be missed.  
The findings based on the six case studies indicating a weakness of EU lobbying 
certainly have to be examined on a more representative basis in order to qualify for a 
generalisable research outcome. Also, comparative research with a methodologically 
sound empirical research framework on US lobbying influence would have to be 
conducted in order to find out whether US lobbying is indeed more influential than 
EU lobbying and to provide comparable empirical data on differences between US 
and EU lobbying impact and the potential reasons for them. However, the current 
literature on both the EU and the US provides sufficient material to develop a set of 
hypotheses in this paper, with which such kind of research can be conducted at a later 
stage. The following outlines are intended to serve the purpose of developing such 
hypotheses. Hence, for the time being, the larger influence of US lobbying is therefore 
simply assumed based on the strong indicators of US lobbying. 
 
2.  Methodological framework: the ‘most similar systems’ EU and the US  
Comparative analysis typically applies either “most similar” or “most different” 
research designs (see Przeworsky and Teune 1970). The comparison of cases with a 
‘most similar’ design works with the assumption that factors that are similar between 
the compared cases are irrelevant to explain variance. It is assumed that a number of 
theoretically significant differences can be found between very similar systems, and 
that these differences contribute to a causal explanation. Most different research 
approaches aim at a largest possible heterogeneity of the selected cases. They are 
based on the assumption that certain characteristic common features of the analysed 
objects can be found despite these differences – ‘most different’ designs work with 
the assumption that factors that are different are irrelevant to explain variance (see 
Przeworsky and Teune 1970: 35). The aim is thus to isolate variables with 
explanatory power (Burnham et al. 2004: 63-64). In the case of a comparison between 
EU and US lobbying, the most similar approach appears most suitable because, as 
above outlined, literature suggests more relevant differences than relevant similarities 
between EU and US lobbying. If lobbying strategies similar to those applied in the US 
are not influential in the EU is not influential, but they are in the US, then this 
difference raises the question what determines lobbying influence. The pre-
assumption is that EU lobbying is not, or weakly, influential while US lobbying does 
have an impact. Hence, variance in the effect on the dependent variable ‘lobbying 
influence’ in this case is to be explained by factors that differ between the two 
systems. Hence, the ‘most similar’ design appears most suitable as a research 
framework for analysis in this case because it helps to focus on factors that differ 
between the systems.  
Przeworsky and Teune criticised the ‘most similar’ approach for the strong way in 
which the initial assumptions determine the research outcome. Since differentiating 
factors take the centre stage, the approach is at the end of its explanatory power if 
differential factors turn out to be less important, i.e., the approach does not allow for 
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(Przeworsky and Teune 1970: 32). The scholars maintain that the ‘most different’ 
design is more open at the outset of an investigation because it can identify both 
differential and similar factors, which then allows for an adjustment of the initial 
research hypotheses in the course of the study. However, maintaining openness 
towards the result should also be possible when starting out with a ‘most similar’ 
design. Proper research conducted along the ‘most similar’ design should either 
confirm the initial hypothesis or indicate at an early stage that more significant 
similarities with explanatory power have to be taken into consideration than can be 
justified with a ‘most similar’ systems approach. Burnham et al. assume 
correspondingly that  
 
“[…] a comparative research design can test hypotheses through isolating the effect of one variable on 
another. Inasmuch as doing so throws up new ideas and possibilities, it can also suggest how the 
hypothesis might be usefully refined or reformulated.” (Burnham et al. 2004: 69).  
 
In that case, the approach will have to be changed and a ‘most different’ design 
appears more suitable.  
Such argumentation already implies the relevance of underlying research hypotheses 
for the selection of the methodological design. Using a comparative design with 
different outcomes but similar variables enables in the case of lobbying influence to 
test two competing theoretical approaches for explaining lobbying and state relations: 
exchange theory and rational choice institutionalism. 
The relationship between public and private actors has long been regarded in terms of 
an exchange relationship (see Bouwen 2002) The exchange approach can be found as 
an implicit research paradigm throughout different concepts of previous studies on 
national and European interest representation (Mayntz 1993: 45). This mainly refers 
to the relationship between public and private actors. The approaches of exchange 
theory model the interaction of at least two actors in an exchange relationship around 
certain goods, determined by supply and demand. The basic assumption is that the 
exchange reaches an optimum when both sides manage to maximize their profit (see 
Walras 1984). It appears very plausible to conceptualise EU lobbying with a 
relationship determined by supply and demand. A demand for influence for interest 
groups can be derived from previous studies (see Bouwen 2002; Henning 2000). In 
addition, the demands of public actors for information from private actors are widely 
acknowledged.  As regards interest group influence, the exchange-theoretical view 
would assume that the way lobbying strategies are organised through functional 
division between lobbyists and through strategies of approaching lobbying targets 
could determine the influence they can gain; i.e., the better the exchange between 
demand and supply is met, the more successful lobbying should be. Hence, if 
lobbying strategies and/or lobbying organisation differ between the US and the EU, 
this could be a factor determining influence. 
Most empirical research with case studies of EU interest intermediation implicitly 
assumes a relationship between public and private actors that corresponds to a rational 
choice-institutionalist view. New institutionalism rests on the assumption that 
behaviour of actors is shaped by institutional norms and rules – political institutions 
as decision-makers and political actors define the space in which politics develops. 
The rational choice variant of institutionalism concludes that actors adapt a means-to 
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political system as far as they have to in order to fulfil their aims (March and Olsen 
1989; Hall and Taylor 1996). The rational-choice institutionalist view found 
implicitly in many case studies on EU lobbying is that private actors adapt to demands 
of the political system, and the political system shapes their behaviour. The political 
system determines whether lobbyists can be influential; if the political system 
necessitates for decision-makers to consider external interests because they could 
otherwise lose their posts, lobbyists can be more influential than in political systems 
where the consideration of external interests is irrelevant to the political future of the 
decision-makers. Hence, if the political system of the US renders it more necessary 
for decision-makers to consider lobbying interests than in the EU, this factor could be 
crucial for the influence lobbyists can exert. 
The two hypotheses do not necessarily rule each other out – however, one may have 
stronger explanatory power for a certain political system than the other and should 
therefore be the dominant theoretical approach, into which the other can be integrated. 
In our case, EU lobbying may be best explained with an institutionalist approach 
while for the assessment of US lobbying, the currently predominant exchange 
approach appears appropriate.  
Comparative analysis assumes an impact of variables on each other (Burnham et al. 
2004; Pickvance 2001; Przeworsky and Teune 1970). Applying a most similar 
research design means that in order to single out variables affecting the degree of 
influence of lobbying in a particular political system, we need to identify factors that 
influence lobbying outcomes per se in the EU and the US, and then we need to single 
out similarities and differences. Differentiating factors affecting lobbying processes 
and outcomes should, according to the assumptions underlying a most similar 
research design, determine the differences in degrees of influence obtained in the EU 
and in the US. Hence, we need to define variables that might have an impact on the 
dependent variable ‘lobbying influence’. Approaches to identifying and explaining 
lobbying in both systems
9 share three elements on which particular focus is directed; 
these are the actors involved in lobbying processes, strategies applied by private 
actors in order to gain access and influence, and the possibilities and constraints 
which are placed on lobbying by rules and norms of the respective political system. 
The assessment of private actors would give information about the first, exchange-
theory-guided hypothesis. Information about public actors would shed light on the 
demand side of the potential exchange, and it would enable to determine the impact of 
the political system. It would thus give information about the second, institutionalism-
guided hypothesis. The analysis of the variables is therefore structured along the lines 
of the hypotheses. 
 
3.  Hypothesis-testing I: examining lobbying behaviour as explanatory variable 
The first hypothesis assuming an exchange relationship between public and private 
actors requires private and public actors to interact in an exchange of demand and 
supply. If the exchange concept accurately describes lobbying, we would have to 
detect a less well-matched demand and supply in the EU than in the US. The problem 
should be inherent in the way lobbyists react to demands of public actors, because 
                                                 
9 such as pluralist or corporatist studies, policy network analysis or exchange theory (see Michalowitz 
2005). 
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influence, in a better initial position of negotiating an exchange. Let us therefore look 
at public and private actors involved and their way of interacting in the two systems. 
For the European Union, three categories of interest intermediation are identified in 
the relevant literature:
10 direct lobbying via individual interest representations of 
specific interests (Greenwood 1997: 2) – so-called in-house lobbyists –, joining forces 
by following collective interests in the form of formal or non-formal associations, 
either at the national level or/and at the European level – so-called Euro groups –, and  
‘hired-hands’- or commercial – lobbyists (Greenwood 1997: 3). 
Euro Groups generally consist of smaller, either national or other member–units and 
concentrate in their work on technical and/or political lobbying aspects of European 
legislation (see Sidenius 1998; McLaughlin and Jordan 1993; Greenwood 1997). 
Most of them represent a large range of European member states within the sector 
they cover. They provide their members with a representative forum of their interest 
sector, with a certain presence in Brussels, with information services and with 
contacts with European Union officials. They are a platform for information exchange 
amongst their members and they produce position papers and other documents that 
are given to the EU institutions, constituting their active lobbying part. Via those 
groups, members can obtain certain positions in formal consultative or even decision–
making committees, e.g. in the comitology system. However, since Euro group 
members perceived difficulties of the associations to sufficiently represent their 
interests and additionally wished to be present in Brussels themselves, more and more 
enterprises as well as national associations - mainly of the business sector - installed 
their individual public affairs offices in Brussels (Coen 1997). Most of these offices 
are small; the majority consists of two to four staff members, i.e. a director, a 
secretary/assistant, and possibly one or two additional assistant managers and interns. 
The relationship between Euro groups and in-house lobbyists has become one of 
cooperation and complementation. Central tasks are the lobbying of Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) and officials from the Permanent Representation of their 
respective nation state; influence of the Eurogroup/inclusion of the national 
perspective and the coverage of issues specific to the national/company/association 
member constituency (Michalowitz 2005).  
Commercial lobbyists seem to become increasingly important with the extent to 
which companies lose interest in being represented themselves and pay more attention 
to the costs of intensive self-lobbying. Political consultants are mainly used long-term 
or short-term to help start Public Affairs work in Brussels, to monitor specific issues 
or institutions which would be too costly to cover with own staff, and for crisis 
management (see Michalowitz 2005; Lahusen und Jauß 2001). They appear to mainly 
constitute a back up to make sure influence is obtainable despite institutional steering 
efforts that diminish the potential to gain influence. Their greatest asset is a very 
detailed knowledge and contact network of and within the European decision-making 
process and its negotiation circles. Their use is apparently rooted in cultural traditions 
– whereas Anglophone lobbying actors in Brussels are more used to, and more likely 
to employ, political consultants, actors of a Germanic origin are more likely to rely on 
their Euro Groups and to see little value in political consultants (Kohler-Koch 1997). 
                                                 
10 Apart from them, other loose forms of collective and individual action at different levels can be 
found. Some authors, for instance, distinguish additionally between promotional groups and territorial 
groups, coalitions, networks and alliances (see Bindi 1996; Coen 1997; Pijnenburg 1998). 
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largely one of functional divisions and of cross-control for clients. Overall, the way 
different lobbyists divide their work between each other or are used for different 
functions by their clients, members or employers demonstrates a high degree of 
professionalisation that appears to be capable of very quickly adapting to changing 
needs and preferences of decision-makers (see Michalowitz 2005).  
The increasing differentiation is often attributed to learning from US lobbying 
structures.
11 At first sight, US lobbying uses a different jargon but appears to be 
essentially structured similarly. Alan Rosenthal distinguishes between contract 
lobbyists – which would correspond to political consultants –, association lobbyists 
who work for interest groups representing various interests, company lobbyists who 
correspond to the in-house lobbyists, and he names two more categories: government 
and cause lobbyists. Government lobbyists belong to local authorities and lobby on 
their behalf.
12 ‘Cause lobbyists’ appear to be a uniquely American lobbying type. 
Rosenthal describes them as groups who rally around a specific issue, generally with a 
moral background:  
 
“Their clients normally have no commercial, material, or governmental interests – rather, their 
concerns are philosophical and ideological. They generally appeal to moral principle.” (Rosenthal 
2001: 19).  
 
Berry distinguishes US interest group types which roughly correspond to internal 
structures of Euro groups and their member organisations on the national, regional 
and local levels; these are umbrella organisations, such as the American Chamber of 
Commerce or the National Federation of Independent Business; so-called restricted 
umbrella groups which consist of companies in groups of industries, such as the 
National Association of Manufacturers or the National Retail Federation; trade 
associations, professional societies and a wide range of specialised business 
associations (see Berry 1979; Wittenberg and Wittenberg 1991; Kollman 1998: 
Rosenthal 2001). Like Euro groups, these differ in the interests they represent. As 
regards the relation between different types of lobbyists, Rosenthal maintains that 
association and corporate lobbyists have long-term commitments to their employers, 
while “contract lobbyists have divided loyalties to legislators and to clients” 
(Rosenthal 2001: 39). For companies, associations rest important forums despite their 
own efforts to conduct lobbying.
13 Contract lobbyists are hired due to own staff 
shortage and due to the experience they bring (Rosenthal 2001: 53–54). 
Hence, overall, the US situation appears to be very similar to EU lobbying. The only 
striking difference in interest organisation appears to be a significantly larger presence 
or at least visibility of non-profit interests, or more precisely, of cause groups, 
professions groups and public interest groups lobbying in the US. Labour unions are 
relatively strong in US interest representation, as well as so-called citizen groups. 
Citizen groups cover a wide span of economic, occupational or other backgrounds and 
represent any type of citizen interest – from pensioner interest groups to the National 
Rifle Association (Berry 1999). The strength of citizen groups is reflected in 
                                                 
11 Various conversations with American lobbyists in Brussels. 
12 The Brussels-counterpart would be the various regional offices which also perform lobbying tasks. 
13 Rosenthal cites a survey in which “[…] 260 companies responded found that 98 percent of them 
belonged to business associations and 99 percent belonged to trade associations”. (Rosenthal 2001: 46). 
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addition, intergovernmental groups, i.e. organisations of state and local governments 
organise to lobby.  
Their presence alone is unlikely to be a factor for differences in lobbying influence, 
but it is worth looking at the lobbying strategies used by these groups and reasons for 
their stronger presence. 
US lobbying strategies also appear largely similar to those used in the EU (see 
Clamen 2000; Mack 1997; Köppl 2000; Gardner 1991). On both sides of the Atlantic, 
lobbyists develop larger networks, and in specific lobbying issues generally first 
define their target groups and then approach them with communication strategies 
adopted to the informal rules of their legislative systems (see Mack 1997; Gardner 
1991; Greenwood 1997). Primary lobbying targets are the different components of 
legislative decision-making– legislators, executive branch officials, regulators and key 
staff aides. Additionally, indirect lobbying channels, such as constituents and other 
contacts that can help carry the lobbying message to those officials are contacted 
(Mack 1997: 236-237; Köppl 2000: 123). Lobbying in the EU is less focused on 
indirect channels of lobbying but also involves lobbying fellow association members 
or seeking allies of other branches – preferably public interest groups – for a common 
interest. In both systems, lobby groups seek allies that they find in other sectors, with 
groups who are outside the usual interest coalition partners, as well as in local 
community officials and in opinion leaders, academics and think tanks, political 
parties and their members and the voter. Effective lobbyists in either system will have 
to be able to identify the necessary target groups and to interrelate with all of them 
adequately. The ability to identify the appropriate target categories has to be 
complemented by an overarching communications strategy (Mack 1997: 243). 
Lobbyists need to be able to adapt to their individual targets’ demands within their 
negotiation strategy, and how these demands are being sold technically – practical 
advice that applies to the EU and national political systems as well (see Köppl 2000; 
Lahusen and Jauß (2001: 117; Mack 1997: 239).  (see Schendelen 2002; Clamen 
2000; Picard et al. 2000). Overall, communication strategies differ between the US 
and the EU due to different demands in the two systems. For instance, linguistic skills 
are important in the EU, the ability to relate to different cultures, and the overall 
lobbying style is less aggressive.
14 
Hence, lobbying strategies and the behaviour demanded again appears to be very 
similar in the EU and the US. However, one important difference may indeed account 
for a potentially different lobbying impact in the EU and the US. US lobbying is 
strongly characterised by activities targeted at the mobilisation of the public, and at 
the shaping of a public opinion, so-called “outside lobbying”. Outside lobbying 
describes activities aimed at the mobilisation of certain publics in order to motivate “ 
[…] citizens outside the policymaking community to contact or pressure public 
officials inside the policymaking community“. (Kollman 1998: 3). The most frequent 
term for such kind of activities is grassroots lobbying (Berry 1979). According to 
Schier, it involves a set of activities ranging from research of target groups, 
identifying key targets within that group in especially important districts, “mass issue 
marketing”, phone and mail contacts. With these activities, members of the public are 
motivated to contact public officials, thereby supporting the interest group’s inside 
lobbying activities (Schier 2000: 173-174). This method is not or only rarely used in 
                                                 
14 Lecture at UBI of John Disharoon, Caterpillar Lobbyist.  
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outside lobbying today plays a much greater role for American decision-making than 
traditional instruments and strategies of lobbying directed directly at decision-makers 
- the inside lobbying:  
 
„Old-fashioned inside lobbying [...] may only have limited effect today. Just as elected officials in 
Washington feel the need to monitor and assuage public opinion through polls and public relations, 
modern lobbying increasingly requires sophisticated methods of public mobilisation. Lobbying in 
Washington is not just a game among well-paid lawyers, ideological activists, and legislators in the 
Capitol. The outside public is increasingly involved.“ (Kollman 1998: 3). 
 
Outside lobbying is also the reason for a strong significance of the media in US 
lobbying (see Mack 1997; Rosenthal 2001; Kollman 1998). Media are needed to 
create a public for the interest represented – and opponents have to be dealt with in 
order to understand their arguments and be able to react to them. EU lobbyists rarely 
concentrate on media lobbying, most likely because no European public exists, or at 
least none that could be easily reached via a modest media strategy.
15  
However, outside lobbying appears to make a lasting impact on politics. Kollman 
concludes that policies are influenced by an interdependent dynamic of opinion 
shaping between the American public and special interest groups (Kollman 1998: 
158). If this is so, and if it remains the only factor of differentiation between EU and 
US lobbying, the successful application of outside lobbying may indeed be the or at 
least one important factor for determining the influence of lobbying. If outside 
lobbying is the crucial factor determining lobbying influence differences in the US 
and the EU leads back to the two initially formulated hypotheses. Perhaps EU 
lobbyists have simply missed out on this lobbying instrument, i.e. they make a 
mistake by not applying outside lobbying strategies. This explanation would support 
the exchange-theoretical hypothesis.  
However, EU lobbying has been around for some time, and American lobbying 
strategies have largely been adopted on the EU level. It would seem odd that the 
apparently most successful instrument has unintentionally been left untouched. 
Outside lobbying is perhaps not as easily applied in the EU as it is in the US. Hence, a 
second explanation appears more plausible; European decision-makers may react 
differently to outside lobbying pressure than US decision-makers. This would mean 
that outside lobbying would not lead to success in Brussels and is therefore not 
employed by EU lobbyists. Such an explanation would strengthen the institutionalist-
guided hypothesis. In the terminology of a comparative research design, the question 
is hence whether outside lobbying constitutes an independent variable that affects the 
degree of lobbying influence, or a spurious variable that stands in a wider context to 
the degree of lobbying influence, but does not affect it (Pickvance 2001). 
The next step of analysis should therefore be the assessment of the lobbying 
receptiveness of European and American decision-makers. This also enables us to test 
the second hypothesis: what is the role the political system, opportunities and 
constraints offer to lobbyists? 
                                                 
15 An American company that tried to employ a media strategy even had to realise that such tactics can 
backfire in Europe; the decision-makers in charge of the case were appalled, no public could be 
mobilised to share the company’s interest in less restrictive legislation on genetically modified 
organisms. 
  104.   Hypothesis-testing II: examining institutional constraints and opportunities 
The rational choice-institutionalist hypothesis is based on the assumption that 
constraints and opportunities for lobbying outcomes are provided by the political 
systems in which lobbyists and decision-makers operate. If this assumption can be 
confirmed, interest group influence is primarily determined by the political systems, 
whereas lobbyists can change little through their behaviour or adaptation to the 
demands of decision-makers – lobbyists are service bureaux rather than equal 
negotiation partners. In this section, we will therefore examine the opportunity 
structures of lobbying provided by the European Union and the United States of 
America, by looking at their political institutions and balances of power. 
EU decision-makers targeted by lobbyists are essentially located in the three main 
decision-making institutions European Commission, European Parliament or Council 
of the European Union. The Commission is very open about its interest in interaction 
with private interests. Its initiating role in the legislative process and its openness can 
be seen as core factors rendering this institution so attractive to private interests. 
Oftentimes the small bureaucratic apparatus of the Commission is mentioned to 
explain a need for external information provision. At first sight, the Commission 
therefore seems to be a target that will easily accept a lobbyist’s arguments. However, 
the Commission takes an active part in structuring external input. Before a planned 
regulation is formulated in a draft, a consultation process is started which invites a 
number of preferred interest groups to comment on the legislative plans in order to 
ensure practical implementability at a later stage (See Aspinwall and Greenwood 
1998: 4; Michalowitz 2002). 
 External interests are not actively invited any more throughout the rest of the process 
within the Commission and until an official proposal is offered to the Council. 
Instead, the Commission seeks to keep lobbyists out of the decisive stages of the 
negotiating process. Private actors can only stay involved if they manage to present 
fresh information that is relevant to the decision (Michalowitz 2002: 43-48). 
The Commission’s role as initiator of legislation also puts the institution as a unit in a 
strong position vis-à-vis other institutions involved in the decision-making. The 
institution can supply a large degree of influence to private actors due to this very 
crucial role in the decision-making process. Proposals by private actors for a 
legislative act that are taken up by the Commission are likely to have a large impact 
on the overall policy outcome, and proposals that are not considered by the 
Commission are not likely to find their way into the document at a later stage. The 
decision-making process enables changes and the omitting of certain parts of a 
proposal, but the possibilities to insert new ideas at the Parliamentary or at the 
Council stage are very limited. 
Although still seen as a weak actor, the European Parliament has steadily won 
influence in European decision-making (Corbett et al. 1995: 235). The Parliament can 
issue amendments to Commission proposals treated in co-operation and co-decision 
procedures. Amendments are drafted in parliamentary committees. A rapporteur
16 will 
be put in charge of organising amendment proposals, which are first agreed upon 
within the committee and then put to a vote in the plenary. This means that core 
                                                 
16 A rapporteur is a committee member who is assigned to chair and prepare the committee’s handling 
of a particular issue. Their committee counterparts are “shadow rapporteurs” who do the same, but 
inofficially, for different political groups in the committee.  
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(shadow–rapporteurs of opposite parties), key figures within the committee and key 
figures within the parliament. Furthermore, political groups and intergroups, 
committees as well as the plenary play a role. Once the amendments are drafted and 
negotiations begin within the committee, these consultations will stop, and bilateral 
talks between MEPs and lobbyists will depend on the initiative of the private actors.  
The Council of the European Union as the body of the national representatives has 
less of a need for any additional information from private actors at the European level, 
and its representatives in Brussels do not have the freedom to take up fresh external 
input.  Nonetheless, it is a target for lobbying, for it is the institution vested with the 
final decision-making power. Lobbyists in general remark that the influence of the 
Council administration is not very great, and lobbying would be wasted. At the same 
time, those who manage to establish good contacts with Permanent Representations of 
individual Member States see a chance to make an impact. It is certainly true that 
substantial changes cannot be made at this final stage, but the influence of the 
preparation body might be understated in the literature and also by its members. 
Although the main decisions of the Council are taken at the Member-State level, the 
working parties up to COREPER are able to influence the  ‘fine tuning’ of decisions. 
Lobbying still takes place, albeit more subtly and informally (see Hayes-Renshaw and 
Wallace 1997). 
Both the Commission and the Parliament communicate clearly, what they want from 
lobbyists. Generally, the receptiveness of Commission departments seems to depend 
on the representivity of the source, and on the substantiality of the material. 
Representivity is highly valued because decisions will have to be applicable in all 
member states and for all involved parties, which means that a single company or 
NGO opinion can rarely be regarded sufficient evidence for the inclusion of an 
argument. On the other hand, the received material must be substantial. Both 
institutions thus show strong efforts to steer and shape the input offered to them. The 
institutions are not free in deciding how much influence they return as a reward to 
services, even if they wanted to. They cannot make decisions independently from 
each other in most cases in which lobbyists are involved, because they need each 
other’s agreement in order to get a measure passed. Governmental actors are the only 
ones who can make a binding decision, but their ability to grant influence depends 
very much on the decision-making procedure. Decision-making power is hence 
dispersed intransparently among the individual bodies. Influence obtained over one 
part of an institution does not guarantee influence of private actors on the overall 
process, and it can remain unclear why interests were not taken up in the final 
decision. Since lobbyists have to deliver their information if they want to obtain any 
influence at all, the institutions can make use of the situation.  
Hence, the balance of power between the EU institutions supports the institutionalist-
guided hypothesis of lobbying influence being determined by the targeted political 
institutions. The question is how much power American political bodies possess to 
steer lobbying influence.  
While the division of powers is even stronger in the American political system, US 
decision-makers appear to be much more affected by outside pressure than EU 
decision-makers. The most important target for US lobbyists is the US Congress. 
Pressure is perceived as being so intense that frequent complaints are made about a 
Congress hamstrung by lobbyists and special interests – a development that has, on 
  12some issues, led to a shift of powers to other branches of the political system (Berry 
1979; Rosenthal 2001). The primary reason for complaints is the power that interest 
groups in particular can exert on the election and re-election chances of a 
congressional member. US scholars stress that legislators are essentially ‚careerist 
legislators’, i.e. they do not have outside income. Hence, they depend on staying in 
office, and this is what drives their decisions (Rosenthal 2001). US lobbying is driven 
by “[...] the issue at hand, the stage it is at in the policymaking process, and the 
organizational constraints of the group limit the choices [of strategies (I.M.)]. 
(Rosenthal 2001: 90).  
Due to the direct election process of Congress members, the re-election depends more 
on constituency interests in the respective states than on national parties and their 
positions. At the same time, the American political system is characterised by a 
relatively strict division of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial 
branch. Unlike EU lobbyists with a focus on executive and legislative lobbying, US 
lobbyists concentrate on the legislative and judicial branch with the strongest efforts 
directed towards the legislative. This is due to the threatening power towards the 
Congress, but also due to the key role Congress has in creating legislation (Berry 
1979; Kollman 1998). To just describe the American legislative process briefly: being 
introduced in either the Senate or the House of Representatives passes legislation in 
form of bills or joint, concurrent and simple resolutions. A bill can be introduced by 
any one member of the Congress in the House he or she is a member of by simply 
“sponsoring” it, i.e. by introducing a draft proposal signed by the respective member. 
This proposal can but does not have to be co-sponsored by other members. The next 
step is the submission of the proposal to a primary and possibly multiple additional 
committees. As in Parliamentary systems in general, these committees are the most 
important element of the legislative process in the Congress, because they thoroughly 
review and debate the proposal. The legislative proposal goes through subcommittees, 
and debates are accompanied from advice sought by the congressional members from 
various departments.  Once a legislative act is approved in one house, the procedure is 
repeated in the other house. Only if both houses come to an agreement, the proposal is 
referred to the US President for approval. Otherwise, the proposal is referred back to 
the initiating house with proposals for amendments.  
Driven the rules imposed by the decision-making process on creating legislation, 
lobbyists primarily seek to find a congress member to support the respective interest 
in a legislative act. Gaining the support of a congressional member is indispensable 
for the success of a lobbying interest (Schroeder 1989).  
To achieve support in Congress, the most important lobbying strategy in US lobbying 
is long-term influence on the composition of the Congress – a feature of lobbying that 
is not found in EU interest intermediation. Interest groups usually support a 
congressional candidate’s election campaign, through so-called Political Action 
Committees (PACs). Electoral campaigns cannot be sponsored directly, but money 
can go into a committee that then finances the campaign. While much concern has 
been voiced in scholarly debates about how much direct influence interest groups can 
exert via the PACs, general conclusions have been that PACs do not buy influence. 
However, they buy access, which can be seen as an important precondition for 
influence (Berry 1979; Bouwen 2002).  
Looking at powers of the American executive reinforces the crucial role of Congress. 
Executive lobbying concerns interest representation towards the US President and 
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finalising a legislative act, the President has the possibility to approve a bill, to 
approve by failing to return the bill with objections to the Congress within ten days, to 
veto or to “pocket veto”.
17 Lobbying the President is interesting due to his broad 
constituency that gives him more freedom of manoeuvre than the individual 
congressional members. The core part of executive lobbying however appears to be 
Presidential lobbying of the Congress. The President himself needs to persuade the 
public of the necessity of a proposal, he collaborates with representatives of 
specifically affected groups and he activates his legislative liaison staff to lobby 
members of Congress. The Washington White House lobbying staff engages for the 
President in lobbying the party leadership, engaging in political horse-trading and 
contacting opposing party members when their votes are needed on major issues. 
When the President makes policy proposals, these usually require Congress to pass 
specific pieces of legislation. Interest groups have to accept his cabinet secretaries, so 
they are heard before the appointment of cabinet members. However, the key 
Presidential target is the Congress. The President’s need of Congressional approval is 
an important difference in power balance as compared to the EU system. With the 
President and his staff, contacts are the most important aspect of lobbying for interest 
groups – more than lobbying for specific interests, contacts with the President are a 
means of political symbolism for both the President and the respective group (Berry 
1979: 173). However, access to the White House is very selective – in 1979, Berry 
quoted a rate of 8% of the Washington lobby groups to have regular contacts (Berry 
1979: 174). Numbers may have changed, but more recent descriptions of lobbying 
strategies suggest that the tendencies are still the same (see Rosenthal 2001; Mack 
1997). 
Executive lobbying in terms of lobbyists lobbying the executive concentrates on 
lobbying agencies that implement legislation and thereby create administrative law 
(Berry 1979: 168). The independent regulatory commissions constitute important 
policy makers – which makes them interesting lobbying targets especially for private 
interest groups. Having been created to regulate and control certain activities of 
private industry, they have sometimes become lobbyists for the groups they are 
supposed to supervise. They possess quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial power; the 
former because Congress lacks expertise and time, so it passes general laws, and the 
commissions are to fill in the details; the latter because the agencies can hold 
hearings, for instance on applications for licensing new carriers for more competition 
in national air traffic. They can bring charges, and they can impose penalties on 
violators of their rules. What causes some concern is the likeliness of agencies to get 
captured by lobbyists – due to their workload and the readiness of lobbyists to provide 
support, some regulatory agencies are serving those they are to control (Berry 1979). 
Finally, as already mentioned, the judicial branch plays a major role for lobbying 
efforts in the American legislative process (Berry 1979:175 onwards). In the EU, 
judicial lobbying is also the last resort in a lobby fight – but US lobbies appear more 
ready to go the judicial route than EU lobbies. Again, influencing the composition of 
the judicial branch, or the respective courts, is an important strategy of US lobby 
groups. The way US judges on various levels are appointed differs largely from the 
way the European Court of Justice is staffed. The executive branch appoints federal 
judges, i.e. the US President appoints them with advice and consent of the Congress. 
                                                 
17 Whenever Congress by their adjournment prevent the return of a bill, the bill does not become a 
legislative act, although the President has not objected (Schroeder 1989: 41).  
  14Legislators, political parties and pressure groups therefore seek to exert maximum 
influence. Judges are appointed for a lifetime and can therefore make a major impact 
on legislation.
18  
However, judicial lobbying is very cost-intensive and is generally only pursued by 
financially strong associations. Like Congressional lobbying, it starts with influence 
seeking on the appointment of judges, especially on the federal level. Before actual 
hearings, indirect court lobbying takes place via a variety of measures aimed at 
influencing the climate of the judicial opinion; usually via lancing articles on the 
issues. Direct court lobbying comprises primarily the sponsorship of litigation and the 
filing of so-called amicus curiae briefs. Litigation means that interest groups pay for 
the costs of taking a case to the courts. Interest groups thus seek to find or create an 
appropriate case in order to get courts to rule a precedence ruling. Since litigation can 
only scarcely be applied, interest groups more often turn to the writing of amicus 
curiae briefs. This is one of most frequent forms of judicial lobbying. The briefs 
consist of written arguments submitted to court in a particular case in support of one 
side. To do so, interest groups need permission of one of the affected parties. This is 
usually easily obtained, since the presence of a large number of supporting amicus 
curiae briefs tends to create the impression that the respective party has popular 
support (Berry 1979).  
All these outlines indeed help to come to conclusions on what is driving interest group 
influence. The core differences found to have an impact on the influence interest 
groups can exert were outside lobbying, stronger efforts to influence the composition 
of decision-making bodies, and a different degree of threatening power due to the 
possibility to influence voting behaviour. However, on the basis of the previous 
discussion of the political decision-making processes in the EU and the US, it can be 
suggested that differences in lobbying tactics between the US and the EU are not the 
source of the different impact of lobbying in the two territories. Instead, they are a 
consequence of the impact of the political systems, and especially of the way 
representation is organised in the EU and the US. Hence, the institutionalist-guided 
hypothesis seems to be closer to reality. Just as US lobbyists react to the opportunities 
and restraints of their political system, EU lobbyists have adapted to theirs – which 
means that certain tactics are worth to be copied; others are unlikely to succeed or be 
too cost-intensive in the EU.  In the US, influencing who becomes a member of 
congress makes sense because congress is the strongest organ. In the EU, influencing 
who becomes a member of the European Parliament is first of all difficult to judge 
since a company would have to be familiar with a complexity of party politics not 
only in fifty federal states but in 25 sovereign nation states which partially again have 
federalist structures. Second, it would not even make much of a difference in 
legislation because the European Parliament is despite gains of strength not the most 
important organ of the EU. The process for naming Commission officials works 
differently, and the Commissioner himself is not the most important person in order to 
reach a legislative change. Grassroots strategies are likely to fail due to the 
                                                 
18 An example given by Berry (1979) of the Ronald Reagan’s legislature may clarify the dimensions. 
After the Presidential election in 1980, more than half of the 750 judges had been appointed by Reagan. 
An unwritten rule which also plays a role in the selection of judges is a courtey practice towards the 
Senate; senators get to reward their party with court positions for judges close to their party. For the 
appointment of judges to appeals courts, the President usually follows the preferences of his senators. 
When it comes to the Supreme Court, the president is more influential than the Senate in the 
appointment of judges. 
  15heterogeneity of the EU and the resulting difficulties in mobilising a sufficiently large 
crowd of like-minded activists. Influencing the media is a difficult task because no 
European-wide accepted European media has developed yet, and it is unlikely to 
emerge. Getting a general message across might be possible in the end, but would 
require a lot more financial resources than the same task in US lobbying.
19 In more 
abstract terms, the interdependencies between the European institutions lead to an 
unbalanced exchange relationship between European private and public actors (see 
also Bouwen 2002; Michalowitz 2005). Whenever private actors offer information, 
individual governmental actors are not able to guarantee influence over policy 
outcomes in return. This means that European governmental actors, seen as an entity, 
may possess a monopoly on influence, but each individual institution or institutional 
unit may not be able to grant influence for received information. The scope of 
influence granting seems to depend very much on the decision-making procedure and 
on the stage of the process. Since the decision-making process consists of a multitude 
of steps and interdependencies of the institutions, an individual institution’s power of 
influence depends essentially on the importance of its role in the process. Private 
actors have little threatening power because they cannot directly influence the 
reappointment of decision-makers. Only the European Parliament is directly elected 
in the member states. Influence is even rare for the EP elections because most 
Member states elect via lists. This renders the candidates largely independent from 
specific constituencies. 
In the US, however, two apparently equally powerful systems – politics and lobbying 
– are competing, and both have negotiation assets with which they become true 
exchange partners. Lobbyists can threaten with voting power; congressmen and 
women possess the decision-making power. Additionally, the division of powers is 
more open to outside participation – and outside pressure – in the US. In Brussels, the 
legislative and executive are united – but the body is composed like an executive. 
Hence, lobbyists have to deal with the problems of lobbying an executive in 
legislative issues as well; the relationship is unbalanced. In the US, legislative 
lobbying is an exchange, whereas the less applied executive lobbying displays 
features comparable to those of traditional Brussels lobbying: 
 
 „[...] administrators also value autonomy and balance their desire for outside support with their desire 
to make decisions themselves.“ (Berry 1979: 171).  
 
This also indicates how outside lobbying success could be related to the dependent 
variable of lobbying influence. Outsider lobbying may be influential precisely 
because the American political system allows such pressure to play a role in US 
policy-making. Hence, outsider lobbying is a result of the variable constraints and 
opportunities offered by the political system. 
 
 
                                                 
19 This is not just an expectation or assumption but is backed by various examples of failed American 
company lobbying in the EU – companies that tried to succeed in Brussels with American-style 
lobbying. 
  165.   Conclusions  
This paper set out to test two hypotheses on lobbying influence via a comparative 
analysis of EU and US lobbying. The first hypothesis motivated by exchange theory 
was that the way lobbying strategies are organised through functional division 
between lobbyists and through strategies of approaching lobbying targets could 
determine the influence they can gain; the better the exchange between demand and 
supply is met, the more successful lobbying should be. Hence, if lobbying strategies 
and/or lobbying organisation differed between the US and the EU, this could be a 
factor determining influence. 
The competing hypothesis motivated by rational choice institutionalism maintained 
that the political system might determine whether lobbyists can be influential. If the 
political system necessitated for decision-makers to consider external interests 
because they could otherwise lose their posts, lobbyists could be more influential than 
in political systems where the consideration of external interests is irrelevant to the 
political future of the decision-makers. Hence, if the political system of the US 
rendered it more necessary for decision-makers to consider lobbying interests than in 
the EU, this factor could be crucial for the influence lobbyists can exert. Confirmation 
of the first hypothesis would have expected differences in the behaviour of lobbyists, 
who did not adequately fulfil their exchange role. Confirmation of the second 
hypothesis would have necessitated crucial differences in the constraints and 
opportunities provided by the two political systems to lobbyists.  
A comparison of lobbying actor organisation, lobbying strategies, decision-making 
processes and the division of power between the institutions demonstrated that 
differences in the behaviour of lobbyists can indeed be observed, but that they are 
consequences of different opportunity structures provided by the respective political 
systems. Essentially, the differentiating variables found in the comparative analysis 
were the use of outsider lobbying in the US as opposed to the restriction to insider 
lobbying in the EU, and the degree of representation in the two systems – US 
lobbyists possess threatening power through their ability to affect voting behaviour 
over the US key legislative institution Congress, whereas EU lobbyists do not possess 
any sanctioning means if their interests are not taken up.  
The analysis certainly lacked a number of systematic assessments. It remains to be 
tested whether US lobbyists really are more influential than European lobbyists – the 
studies claiming US lobbying influence do not provide systematic information about 
initial intentions in diverse involved bodies and lobby groups, the entire lobbying 
process and the impact on the outcome. In addition, the question as to whether outside 
lobbying really makes a crucial difference for the degree of lobbying influence has 
not been answered. One could compare lobbying cases of periods in which outside 
lobbying was not as important as is stated in the literature of the 21
st century with 
recent cases. If outside lobbying does not make such a big difference in lobbying 
influence, the assumptions of this paper would have to be revised. 
As for the current state of the literature, however, the evidence for US lobbying power 
and a certain weakness of EU lobbying seems sufficiently strong.  
One conclusion for the larger context of consequences of representative democracy is 
that the more representative a democratic system becomes, the more powerful 
lobbyists can be expected to become. The less representative, the more independent 
governmental actors will be from external pressure. The less representative, the less 
  17likely is a capture, and lobbying may thus be a healthier contributor to political 
decision-making than in a more representative system. The EU-system, with its lack 
of rigorously democratic checks and balances, can still be seen as relatively immune 
against outside pressure (from voters and from specific interests). Institutional 
officials can select whom to listen to – which may not seem any closer to a truly 
democratic solution than a capture of politicians by lobbyists, but which leaves the 
power to the governmental actors. In a more democratic system, with a dependency of 
governmental actors on votes, the lobbyists can be expected to become stronger. This 
is obviously the case in the US, but also in individual nation-states.  
Capture by interest groups is a problem for democratic governance, and so is a 
restrictive handling of access and pressure by interests. This study aims by no means 
to suggest a less democratic structure of governance in order to solve potential 
problems with overly influential lobbyists. However, this weakness of democratic 
cultures deserves to be pointed out, and it should be considered as a problem inherent 
in the freedom of speech, association and in governance by the citizen. 
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